LINCOLN MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW
__________________________________
VOLUME 9

FALL 2021

ISSUE 1

_____________________________________
LAYING IT ON THE LINE:
HOW HERNANDEZ V. MESA NIXED BIVENS FOR
A TRANSNATIONAL HOMICIDE
SEAN DAVIS
I. INTRODUCTION: NEIGHBORS, WORLDS APART
Two nations: two minds, two bodies, one line.1 A line
that has separated two cultures with different policies,
ideologies, economies, governments, strengths, and
weaknesses since the mid-1800s.2 A line that is associated
with security and sacrifice, with hope and heartbreak.3 A
line, as it turns out, that means something when it comes to
law enforcement action and the application of law.4
See U.S.–Mexico Border, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.national
geographic.org/media/tijuana-border-fence/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2021).
2 Cf. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, BRITANNICA, https://www.britanniaca.
com/event/Treaty-of-Guadalupe-Hidalgo (last updated Jan. 26, 2021)
(“With this annexation [in 1848], the continental expansion of the United
States was completed except for the land added in the Gadsden
Purchase (1853).”).
3 Cf. U.S.–Mexico Border, supra note 1 (“All the border fortification is
intended to reduce illegal immigration to the United States from Mexico.
Most immigrants who cross the U.S.–Mexico border illegally flee
extreme poverty in Mexico. . . Crossing the border near Tijuana–San Diego
is dangerous. The crosses in this photograph represent the hundreds of
men, women, and children who have died in the area while trying to reach
the United States.”).
4 See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B.
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One such law enforcement action implicated the Mexico–
U.S. border in 2010 when a U.S. Border Patrol officer shot
and killed a teenage boy, who was a citizen and resident of
Mexico, giving rise to Hernandez v. Mesa.5 The officer,
claiming he was reacting to being assaulted with rocks
during an illegal entry attempt, fired his weapon from U.S.
soil at the teenager, who had run from the United States
back to the Mexico side of the border.6 Lacking a statutory
claim for the alleged violation of their son’s constitutional
rights, the teenager’s parents relied on a U.S. Supreme Court
case that created a cause of action for violations similar to
the one in their case, hoping it would equally apply.7
That recovery theory, known as the Bivens doctrine,
was a way to sue federal officials personally for violating
constitutional rights in certain circumstances.8 But the
Bivens doctrine lacked a precise scope when it first came into
being; its borders were amoebic—undefined and ready to
absorb anything for food.9 Indeed, the doctrine behaved as
such at the outset as the Supreme Court fed it disanalogous
cases and failed to define its shape.10 It also reaped criticism
for defying the separation of powers and having an
undesirable effect on the function of law enforcement.11 But
the Court became more sensitive to the roles of the different
branches of government and soon began the process of
limiting Bivens’s application, narrowing its scope drastically
over a period of decades.12 By the time the Hernandez
lawsuit reached the Supreme Court, Bivens jurisprudence
had laid out a more defined process for determining when
Bivens already applied to an action and, if it did not apply,
when it should be expanded to cover the new context.13
In Hernandez, the Court issued a 5–4 decision, ruling
that the action was not already covered by Bivens and, given
the circumstances—namely, implicating the international
border between the United States and Mexico—Bivens
See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 740 (2020).
Id.
7 See id.
8 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
9 See infra Part II.A.
10 See infra Part II.A.
11 See infra Part II.A.
12 See infra Part II.B.
13 See infra Part II.B.
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should not be expanded to cover it.14 This Note asserts that
the Court reached the right conclusion in Hernandez,
although its arguments were not always impervious to
criticism.15 The Hernandez decision was consistent with the
Court’s pattern of boxing Bivens in and it teed Bivens up to
be jettisoned in the future.16 Eliminating Bivens would be
consistent with the separation of powers and Hernandez
rightly puts the spotlight on Congress to formulate an
effective solution.17
This Note in Part II looks at the cases that created
and molded the Bivens doctrine, beginning with the original
and expansion cases, then the cases in which a Bivens claim
was rejected.18 Part III walks through the factual
circumstances that led to the lawsuit, considering both the
agent’s and the parents’ perspectives.19 Part IV considers,
step by step within the Bivens framework, the arguments the
majority made for the proposition that Hernandez did not
warrant a Bivens remedy and the arguments the dissent
made against that proposition.20 Part IV also analyzes the
concurrence’s contention that the Bivens doctrine should be
retired.21 Part V contemplates the legal and practical effects
Hernandez will have and what might happen if the Bivens
doctrine were to be retired, as the concurrence advocated.22
Part VI concludes by exhorting Congress to deliberate on the
direction Bivens remedies are heading and to decide whether
to allow that type of lawsuit by enacting legislation.23

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: AN IMPLIED CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR EXPRESS RIGHTS

See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B.
See infra Part IV.
16 See infra Part IV.
17 See infra Part IV.C.
18 See infra Part II.
19 See infra Part III.
20 See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B.
21 See infra Part IV.C.
22 See infra Part V.
23 See infra Part VI.
14
15
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When Bivens remedies were created, they provided a
way for plaintiffs to recover damages from federal officials
who violated their Fourth Amendment rights.24 Two cases
after Bivens extended that remedy to certain Fifth and
Eighth Amendment claims.25 Due, in part, to concerns that
the judiciary was performing a legislative function by
expanding Bivens remedies, the Supreme Court began
narrowing down Bivens’s applicability, developed a more
specific method to analyze requests for Bivens relief, and did
not extend Bivens to any case that reached the Court
thereafter.26

A. CONCEPTION AND EARLY EXPANSION OF THE BIVENS
DOCTRINE
In 1946, the Supreme Court in Bell v. Hood left open
the question of whether a Fourth Amendment violation by a
federal officer acting in the performance of the officer’s duties
necessarily provides grounds for a damages suit. 27 Federal
tort lawsuits, which used to be the primary method of
recovery against federal officials, had become a thing of the
past following Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.28 Twenty-five years
later, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, the Court answered Bell’s question in
the affirmative.29 In Bivens, federal agents entered the
plaintiff’s home in New York with neither a warrant nor
probable cause, thoroughly searched the home, and arrested
the plaintiff for violations related to narcotics.30 In deciding
to find an implied damages remedy for the constitutional
violation, the Court considered both the history of according
damages for violating personal liberty and its holding from
Bell that “where legal rights have been invaded, and a
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A.
26 See infra Part II.B.
27 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)). The Fourth
Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
28 Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 748 (2020).
29 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. For a discussion on the history of civil liability
for federal officers, see Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 748.
30 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
24
25
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federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such
invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to
make good the wrong done.” 31 The Court also noted that
there were “no special factors counseling hesitation in the
absence of affirmative action by Congress” and that the
plaintiff lacked other possible remedies for his harm.32 The
concurring opinion expounded on this point, explaining that
for Bivens, “it [was] damages or nothing.”33 However, the
Court did not explain what it meant by “special factors
counseling hesitation,” only suggesting that “dealing with a
question of ‘federal fiscal policy’” or total absence of a
constitutional violation might qualify.34 The effect of the
case was that plaintiffs could seek damages against federal
agents personally for warrantless searches and arrests in
violation of the Fourth Amendment if no factors counseled
hesitation and the plaintiff had no alternate remedy.35
Three dissenting opinions highlighted various
concerns.36 Justice Burger’s concern was that the majority’s
ruling was out of line with the separation of powers
doctrine.37 In Justice Black’s dissent, he noted that Congress
had already made a remedy for similar causes of action
against state officials and stated that Congress could do the
Id. at 395–96 (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 684). However, the Court clearly
recognized that there was no such federal statute here, instead justifying
the creation of the remedy by Congress’s silence. Id. at 397 (“For we have
here no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal
officer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money
damages from the agents . . .”).
32 Id. at 396–97. The latter came down to a question of whether a plaintiff
in an action for federal agents violating Fourth Amendment rights “[was]
entitled to redress his injury through a particular remedial mechanism
normally available in the federal courts.” Id. at 397 (citing J. I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13,
16 (1933)).
33 See id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34 See id. at 396–97 (majority opinion).
35 See id. at 397.
36 See, e.g., id. at 411 (Burger, J., dissenting).
37 See id. at 411–12. See generally Robert Longley, Separation of Powers,
THOUGHTCO, https://www.thoughtco.com/separation-of-powers-3322394,
(last updated Apr. 5, 2020) (providing an overview of the powers of each
branch of the government and the doctrine of separation of powers).
Justice Burger opined that this decision was the work of the legislative
branch, something the judiciary was ill equipped to do. See Bivens, 403
U.S. at 411–12 (Burger, J., dissenting). Justice Black also believed
creating the availability of this remedy was outside the powers of the
judiciary. See id. at 427–28 (Black, J., dissenting).
31
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same for federal officials if it believed such legislation was
prudent.38 Meanwhile, Justice Blackmun made the point
that the effect this ruling would have on law enforcement—
that proper enforcement would be “stultif[ied]”—was a factor
that counseled hesitation.39
The Bivens decision could reasonably have been
interpreted more narrowly since the Court specifically
provided the remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.40
However, the Bivens Court did not explicitly limit its decision
to Fourth Amendment violations; thus, it left the door wide
open for a Court that apparently believed fashioning
remedies was more important than the concerns flagged by
the dissenters.41
Over the ensuing nine years, cases involving this new
Bivens claim reached the Supreme Court twice.42 First, in
Davis v. Passman, a Fifth Amendment due process claim
arose after a congressman wrongfully terminated a deputy
administrative assistant on the basis of sex. 43 In Davis, the
See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 427–28 (Black, J., dissenting). See generally 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (creating personal liability for state officials who
violate constitutional rights).
39 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[Allowing
suspects to sue federal officers in federal court] will tend to stultify proper
law enforcement and to make the day’s labor for the honest and
conscientious officer even more onerous and more critical.”).
40 See id. at 397 (majority opinion) (“Having concluded that petitioner’s
complaint states a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment, we hold
that petitioner is entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he
has suffered as a result of the agents’ violation of the [Fourth]
Amendment.” (citation omitted)).
41 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 750 (2020) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (quoting J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964)
(citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239
(1969); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969)) (“In the
decade preceding Bivens, the Court believed that it had a duty ‘to be alert
to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective’ Congress’[s]
purposes in enacting a statute. Accordingly, the Court freely created
implied private causes of action for damages under federal statutes.”
(internal quotations omitted)).
42 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228 (1979).
43 Davis, 442 U.S. at 231. The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part:
“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. This Due Process Clause
contains within it a guarantee of equal protection of the laws, so a
government official firing someone on the basis of sex would violate due
38
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Court reasoned that where there was no “‘textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a
coordinate political department,’ we presume that justiciable
constitutional rights are to be enforced through the courts.”44
Following Bivens, the Court held that the plaintiff had no
other remedy available to her and that some factors did
counsel hesitation in that context, but countervailing
interests overrode them.45 The Court thus allowed for the
plaintiff to seek a damages remedy under Bivens against the
(then-former) congressman for alleged wrongful termination
based on sex in violation of Fifth Amendment due process.46
Multiple dissenting opinions again followed this
decision.47 Notably, Justice Burger once more expressed his
belief that this action by the Court “encroache[d] on that
barrier” of separation of powers.48 Justice Powell was also
concerned about the separation of powers but wrote
separately to criticize the majority’s method of applying
Bivens, calling it “not an exercise of principled discretion.”49
process by failing to afford that equal protection. See Davis, 442 U.S. at
235.
44 Davis, 442 U.S. at 242 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
45 See id. at 245–46. The Court did not name what those factors were,
allowing the idea of factors counseling hesitation to remain clouded. See
id. at 246.
46 See id. at 248–49.
47 See, e.g., id. at 249 (Burger, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart’s dissent
was the least notable, as he dissented on the grounds that the case
presented a separate dispositive issue that should have been ruled on
before addressing damages. Id. at 251 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating
that the case presented a Speech and Debate Clause issue which may have
granted the defendant immunity).
48 Id. at 250. Justices Powell and Rehnquist agreed with this assertion.
See id. at 249.
49 Id. at 254 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also joined this
opinion. Id. at 251. Justice Powell used the words of Justice Harlan’s
concurrence from Bivens to set up this point:
[T]he exercise of this responsibility [(inferring private
causes of action from the Constitution)] involves
discretion, and a weighing of relevant concerns. . . . [A]
court should “take into account [a range of policy
considerations] at least as broad as the range of those a
legislature would consider with respect to an express
statutory authorization of a traditional remedy.”
Id. at 252 (last alteration in original) (quoting Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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These problems again took a back seat to the Court’s desire
to create remedies, while the opinion failed to clarify how far
Bivens could reach and what it meant to have a factor
counseling hesitation.50
Following that decision, Carlson v. Green took up the
question of whether Bivens should apply in yet another set
of circumstances, in an Eighth Amendment cruel and
unusual punishment claim.51 The plaintiff in Carlson was
the mother of a federal prisoner who died as a result of a
health emergency during which prison hospital staff
provided inadequate medical treatment.52 There, the Court
curiously altered the character of a Bivens claim analysis by
stating that such claims “may be defeated in a particular
case . . . . [W]hen defendants demonstrate ‘special factors
[counseling] hesitation in the absence of affirmative action
by Congress’”53 or, alternatively, “when defendants show
that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it
explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery
directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally
effective.”54 What changed was that, by its language, the
Court seemingly presumed a Bivens claim would be proper,
shifting the burden to the defendant to defeat it.55 It also
narrowed the definition of what qualified as an alternative
remedy—suddenly some Bivens claims could be brought even
if a remedy already existed, as long as Congress had not
expressly stated the remedy stood in place of Bivens.56 The
See id. at 246–49 (majority opinion).
See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16–17 (1980). The Eighth Amendment
states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
52 Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 671 (7th Cir. 1978), aff’d, 446 U.S. 14
(1980).
53 See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396) (citing
Davis, 442 U.S. at 245).
54 Id. at 18–19 (citing Davis, 442 U.S. at 245–47; Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397).
55 See id. at 26 (Powell, J., concurring) (lamenting the lack of “principled
discretion” and stating: “Today we are told that a court must entertain
a Bivens suit unless the action is ‘defeated’ . . . .”).
56 See id. at 26–27.
Bivens recognized that implied remedies may be
unnecessary when Congress has provided “equally
effective” alternative remedies. The Court now
volunteers the view that a defendant cannot defeat
a Bivens action simply by showing that there are
50
51
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Court found no factors counseled hesitation,57 and failed
again to define what a factor counseling hesitation was.58 As
for the remedies analysis, the Court held that while the
plaintiff had an adequate remedy through the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), Congress had not “explicitly stat[ed]”
that the FTCA precluded plaintiffs from bringing Bivens
claims.59 Extending the Bivens claim to this new context, the
Court stated that federal officials should be aware they may
face Bivens suits for their misconduct just as state officials
should be aware they may face lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for their illegal actions.60
While seven Justices ultimately approved of the
judgment, four Justices, in a concurrence and two dissents,
expressed grief with the majority’s reckless expansion of the
Bivens doctrine.61 Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, took issue
with Bivens itself and again raised the separation of powers
problem.62 In his view, “Bivens [was] a decision ‘by a closely
divided court, unsupported by the confirmation of time,’ and,
as a result of its weak precedential and doctrinal foundation,
it [could not] be viewed as a check on ‘the living process of

adequate alternative avenues of relief. . . . These are
unnecessarily rigid conditions. The Court cites no
authority and advances no policy reason—indeed no
reason at all—for imposing this threshold burden upon
the defendant in an implied remedy case.
Id. (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397) (citing Davis, 442 U.S. at 248); see
also id. at 31 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“Until today, I had thought
that Bivens was limited to those circumstances in which a civil rights
plaintiff had no other effective remedy.” (citing Bivens 403 U.S. at 410
(Harlan, J., concurring); Davis, 442 U.S. at 245 & n.23)).
57 Id. at 19 (majority opinion).
58 Id. at 27 (Powell, J., concurring).
59 Id. at 19–20 (majority opinion).
60 Id. at 25 (quoting Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592 (1978)).
61 See id. at 26–27 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 30 (Burger, J., dissenting);
id. at 33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Burger concluded that “in
future cases the Court will be obliged to retreat from the language of
today’s decision.” Id. at 31 (Burger, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 34–35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court appears to be
fashioning for itself a legislative role resembling that once thought to be
the domain of Congress, when the latter created a damages remedy for
individuals whose constitutional rights had been violated by state officials
and separately conferred jurisdiction on federal courts to hear such
actions.” (citations omitted) (citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979))).
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striking a wise balance between liberty and order.’”63 Justice
Burger dissented because of the way the Court changed the
analysis for the existing remedies factor.64 Justice Powell’s
concurrence, with Justice Stewart joining, voiced the same
type of criticism but joined the judgment out of a conviction
that state and federal officials should be subject to the same
liability for the same wrongdoing.65 So Bivens remedies
continued to be a sharply divided issue. 66
At this point in the Bivens history, a claim involving
a constitutional violation by a federal official would
presumably be heard under Bivens unless the defendant
either identified special factors counseling hesitation—
which had yet to be defined—or identified an “equally
effective” remedy that Congress enacted with the express
purpose of replacing a remedy “directly under the
Constitution.”67 This application and reckless treatment,
however, would not last long.68

B. REVERSING COURSE
Starting in 1983 and continuing through 2017, the
Supreme Court went through a process of reining Bivens in
by denying its extension to each of the nine cases it heard
that sought a Bivens remedy.69 The Court leaned on three
Id. at 32 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring)) (citing Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532–33 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976)).
64 Id. at 30 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“The Federal Tort Claims Act provides
an adequate remedy for prisoners’ claims of medical mistreatment. For
me, that is the end of the matter.”).
65 Id. at 25, 30 (Powell, J., concurring).
66 See supra text accompanying notes 36–65.
67 Id. at 18–19 (majority opinion) (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
245–47 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)).
68 See infra Part II.B.
69 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020) (citing Ziglar v.
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1863–64 (2017); Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118
(2012); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007); Corr. Servs. Corp. v.
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471
(1994); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988); United States v.
Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296
(1983); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983)) (“[F]or almost 40 years, we
have consistently rebuffed requests to add to the claims allowed
under Bivens.”).
63
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prevailing reasons for denying Bivens in these cases70: (1)
special factors counseled hesitation, 71 (2) some other form of
process was available to the plaintiff, 72 and (3) the defendant
was not a party that Bivens was intended to support action
against.73 To illustrate this third reason, in FDIC v. Meyer74
the Court explained that “the purpose of Bivens is to deter
the officer” from unlawful conduct, and bringing a Bivens
action against a federal agency would defeat that purpose by
failing to hold the individual officer accountable.75 Thus,
actions against federal agencies, corporate defendants, and
federal officers whose subordinates’ actions caused the harm
See infra text accompanying notes 71–73. Some of the cases fit into more
than one of these categories. See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying
text.
71 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860 (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74) (holding
that Bivens was not to be used to bring about a change in policy); Meyer,
510 U.S. at 486 (holding that “creating a potentially enormous financial
burden for the Federal Government” counseled hesitation); Stanley, 483
U.S. at 681–82 (holding that “the insistence . . . with which the
Constitution confers authority over the Army, Navy, and militia upon the
political branches” counseled hesitation); Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300, 304
(citing military discipline and Congress’s constitutional authority to
regulate the military justice system); Bush, 462 U.S. at 389 (citing the
effect such lawsuits could have on federal employees’ supervisors’
willingness to enforce what they believe to be proper discipline measures).
The Court specifically stated in Stanley that the fact that the plaintiff had
no other remedy available to him was irrelevant because “congressionally
uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary [was]
inappropriate.” Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683.
72 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1863 (habeas corpus); Minneci, 565 U.S. at 131
(state law afforded the plaintiff the opportunity to bring action against the
defendant as a private employee); Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 553–54
(administrative and judicial processes for each complaint); Malesko, 534
U.S. at 72–73 (the option to bring a negligence claim instead); Schweiker,
487 U.S. at 417, 424–25 (1988) (an elaborate system for appeals and
retroactive payments); Chappell, 462 U.S. at 303 (Board for the Correction
of Naval Records, having power to grant backpay and retroactive
promotion); Bush, 462 U.S. at 387–88 (Civil Service Commission and
appeals processes).
73 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct at 1860 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676
(2009) (officers should not be responsible for the acts of their
subordinates); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 63, 71 (corporate defendant providing
services under contract with a federal agency); Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485
(federal agency as defendant).
74 Meyer, 510 U.S. at 473. Meyer was a case where a manager of a failed
thrift institution sued the corporation that fired him when the California
Savings and Loan Commissioner seized his business and assigned that
corporation as its receiver. See id.
75 Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485 (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980)).
70
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were held to be outside Bivens’s scope.76
During this period, Bivens experienced a number of
significant changes.77 For one, the role of the availability of
other forms of process became muddled as the Court
departed from considering it separately, instead mixing it in
with the special-factors analysis (as evidence that Congress
had deliberately provided for those remedies and no
others).78 However, throughout Bivens’s progression, the
availability of other remedies remained significant enough
that it recaptured its separate role as a threshold issue. 79
Another important development in the law over this period
was the Court characterizing the special-factors inquiry as
“considering whether there are reasons for allowing
Congress to prescribe the scope of relief that is made
available.”80 For example, in its special-factors analysis in
United States v. Stanley, the Court ruled that Bivens claims
by servicemembers were precluded if the conduct was
“incident to service” because the Constitution provided that
See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct at 1869; Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74; Meyer, 510 U.S.
at 486.
77 See infra text accompanying notes 78–86.
78 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (“[T]he concept
of ‘special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative
action by Congress’ has proved to include an appropriate judicial deference
to indications that congressional inaction has not been inadvertent. When
the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided
what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional
violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not
created additional Bivens remedies.”).
79 Cf., e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (quoting Bush v.
Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983) (“[T]he decision whether to recognize
a Bivens remedy may require two steps. In the first place, there is the
question whether any alternative, existing process for protecting the
interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain
from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages. But even in
the absence of an alternative, a Bivens remedy is a subject of judgment:
‘the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is
appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed, however,
to any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind
of federal litigation.’” (citation omitted))).
80 Bush, 462 U.S. at 380.
Following this type of analysis, the Court
believed Congress should be the one to create the remedy. Id. at 388–90
(quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 302
(1947)) (“[W]e decline ‘to create a new substantive legal liability without
legislative aid and as at the common law’ because we are convinced that
Congress is in a better position to decide whether or not the public interest
would be served by creating it.” (citation omitted)).
76
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Congress would have the power to govern and regulate the
military.81 Finally, the Court had shined some light on the
special factors inquiry.82
More notably, as early as 1988, the Court began to
recognize that it felt apprehension when considering
expanding Bivens.83 In the midst of that, the Court
developed a means of identifying what cases Bivens already
applied to and where Bivens required an extension, utilizing
the idea of “context” to make that determination.84 In 2017,
Ziglar v. Abbasi defined “new context” to mean “the case is
different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases
decided by this Court,” and it offered numerous suggestions
that would indicate how a case might differ in a meaningful
way.85 Context became a considerable part of the analysis in
Abbasi, constituting the first of two prongs in the analysis to
decide if a case warranted the Bivens remedy.86
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681–82 (1987).
See supra text accompanying notes 80–81.
83 Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 421 (“Our more recent decisions have responded
cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies be extended into new
contexts.”).
84 See Meg Green, Comment, Standing on the Wrong Side: Hernandez v.
Mesa and Bivens Remedies in the Context of Cross-Border Shootings by
Federal Law Enforcement, 61 B.C. L. REV. (ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENT) II.18, II.-24 to -25 (2020).
85 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1859 (2017). This non-exhaustive list
included:
[T]he rank of the officers involved; the constitutional
right at issue; the generality or specificity of the official
action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer
should respond to the problem or emergency to be
confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under
which the officer was operating; the risk of disruptive
intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other
branches; or the presence of potential special factors that
previous Bivens cases did not consider.
Id. at 1860.
86 Cf. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. passim. All of the opinions of Abbasi made use of
the word “context” fifty times combined, compared to fifty-eight times total
in the previous eleven cases. See id. passim; Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S.
118, 127 (2012) (twice); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 575 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (once); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S.
61 passim (2001) (eight times); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 passim (1994)
(six times, including footnotes); Schweiker, 487 U.S. passim (seventeen
times); Stanley, 483 U.S. passim (fourteen times, including footnotes);
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983) (quoting Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1981)) (once); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,
81
82
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The Abbasi decision was the most recent Supreme
Court ruling on a Bivens claim prior to Hernandez, giving the
Hernandez Court the framework it would operate within.87
At this point, the alternative remedies issue stood essentially
as a threshold requirement, acting as a roadblock to Bivens
remedies where the plaintiff had another method of relief.88
A case would undergo a two-prong analysis in determining
whether to grant the remedy.89 First, a case that fell within
a previously recognized Bivens context may proceed, but a
case that presented a new context (i.e., was different in a
meaningful way) was required to undergo the next stage of
analysis before Bivens would apply.90 In that next stage, a
case involving special factors that counseled hesitation
would not be allowed to proceed, but a case where no factors
counseled hesitation would be heard on the merits
(presuming there were no other challenges).91 This second
prong was critical to respect the separation of powers.92
Thus, in the years following Bivens’s expansion, the
Court dramatically reduced the vagueness surrounding
Bivens by providing more definition and substantially
whittled it down so it no longer seemed as imposing as had

372 (1983) (once); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 passim (1980) (six times,
including footnotes); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 253 n.2 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (once); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 412 (1971) (Burger, J., dissenting)
(once).
87 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct 735, 740 (2020).
88 Cf. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858 (quoting Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550) (“[I]f
there is an alternative remedial structure present in a certain case, that
alone may limit the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of
action. For if Congress has created ‘any alternative, existing process for
protecting the [injured party’s] interest’ that itself may ‘amoun[t] to a
convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new
and freestanding remedy in damages.’” (second and third alterations in
original)).
89 See infra text accompanying notes 90–91.
90 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856, 1860.
91 See id. at 1857–58 (“[T]he Judiciary [must be] well suited, absent
congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and
benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.”).
92 See id. at 1858 (“In sum, if there are sound reasons to think Congress
might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy as part of the
system for enforcing the law and correcting a wrong, the courts must
refrain from creating the remedy in order to respect the role of Congress
in determining the nature and extent of federal-court jurisdiction under
Article III.”).
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been.93 And with that, the legal stage was set for
Hernandez.94

III. FACTS: WHERE BIVENS MET BORDERS
Sergio Hernandez was a citizen of Mexico living in
Ciudad Juarez, near the Mexico–U.S. border, in 2010.95 A
dry, concrete culvert divided Ciudad Juarez from El Paso,
Texas, and the border separating the countries went down
the center of it.96 The only physical indicators of the border
were the fences on either side of the culvert.97 Hernandez’s
family said that at the time of the incident, fifteen-year-old
Hernandez and his friends were playing a game where they
would start at the fence at the top of the culvert on the
Mexico side of the border, run across the culvert, touch the
fence on the U.S. side of the culvert, and run back.98 Jesus
Mesa was an agent for the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Agency (CBP) assigned to patrol the border and
apprehend people illegally entering the United States.99
Mesa said that Hernandez and his friends were attempting
to illegally enter the United States and that they started
throwing rocks at him.100 Mesa detained one of the friends
and Hernandez ran back to the Mexico side. 101 While
Hernandez was across the border, Mesa shot at Hernandez
twice, hitting him once and killing him.102
At the time he shot, Mesa did not know for certain
what nationality Hernandez was.103 The Department of
Justice investigated the incident and, in deciding not to take
any action against Mesa, concluded that he had acted within
the bounds of his training and CBP policy.104 The United
States subsequently refused Mexico’s request to extradite

See supra text accompanying notes 69–85.
See supra text accompanying note 87.
95 Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 740, 753 (2020).
96 Id. at 740.
97 Id. at 753.
98 Id. at 740.
99 Id. at 740, 746.
100 Id. at 740.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 753.
104 Id. at 740.
93
94
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Mesa for criminal prosecution.105
With no other legal recourse, Hernandez’s parents
brought a civil claim against Mesa under Bivens, seeking
damages for the alleged violation of Hernandez’s Fourth and
Fifth Amendment rights.106 The District Court for the
Western District of Texas dismissed the claim, and the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.107 The Supreme Court
first vacated the judgment and remanded for the circuit court
to consider the Court’s recent Abbasi decision in its
analysis.108 The circuit court again dismissed the claim
because it found the case presented a new context and
multiple factors counseled against extending Bivens to it.109
The Supreme Court then took up the case for final
disposition and affirmed the circuit court’s decision.110

IV. ANALYSIS: CONTEXTS AND FACTORS
The Court first addressed the issue of whether
Hernandez’s circumstances presented a new context that
had not yet qualified for a Bivens remedy.111 The Court
correctly held that it was a new context, and proceeded to
answer the question of whether there were special factors
counseling hesitation before extending Bivens.112 The
Court’s decision that there were such factors was the right
conclusion based on the jurisprudence, and the subsequent
denial of the Bivens remedy was thus proper.113 The
concurrence asserted that Bivens’s foundation has been
profoundly weakened and that the doctrine should be done
away with.114 The rationale supporting that assertion is
strong, especially when considering the government’s
fundamental separation of powers.115

Id.
Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 741.
110 Id.
111 See infra Part IV.A.
112 See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B.
113 See infra Part IV.B.
114 See infra Part IV.C.
115 See infra Part IV.C.
105
106
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A. WAS HERNANDEZ A NEW CONTEXT FOR BIVENS?
1. ARGUMENTS
Characterizing the concept of a new context as
“broad,” the majority relied heavily on Abbasi’s contributions
to “context” to deduce that the plaintiffs’ claim was, indeed,
a new context.116 Even though the lawsuit came under
amendments to the Constitution that had served as the basis
for previously sustained Bivens actions—the Fourth
Amendment (in Bivens itself) and the Fifth Amendment (in
Davis v. Passman)—the majority accurately pointed out that
claims under the same amendment may still present
different contexts.117 In its contexts analysis, the majority
described the original Bivens context as an “allegedly
unconstitutional arrest and search carried out in New York
City” and the Davis context as an “alleged sex discrimination
on Capitol Hill,” and held that those were different in a
meaningful way from Hernandez’s “cross-border shooting
claims” at the Mexico–U.S. border.118 The majority did not
expound on the meaning of “different in a meaningful way”
and did not add much explanation to its decision here, only
citing “the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into
the functioning of other branches”—one of the suggestions
from Abbasi’s “meaningful difference” list.119 With that, the
majority concluded “[t]here [was] a world of difference
between those claims,” and that it was “glaringly obvious”
Hernandez presented a new context.120
See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743–44 (2020).
See id. at 743 (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71–74
(2001); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16–18 (1980)); Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228, 231 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). Carlson and Malesko both
arose under the Eighth Amendment, but Carlson was allowed the Bivens
claim and Malesko was not. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 743.
118 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 744 (citing Davis, 442 U.S. at 230; Bivens,
403 U.S. at 389).
119 See id. at 743–44 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017);
supra note 85.
120 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 743–44. However, the Court discussed in
more detail the idea of intrusion on other branches’ territory in its specialfactors analysis. See id. at 744–45. In Abbasi’s application of the “different
in a meaningful way” concept, the Court similarly neglected to explain how
the framework it had just set out distinguished Abbasi from previous
116
117
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Unsurprisingly, the dissent argued that the plaintiffs’
claim fell squarely within the same context as Bivens
itself.121 The dissent reached this conclusion by drawing the
lines of Bivens’s context more broadly than the majority
did—as a case involving a rogue officer using unreasonable
force to effect an unreasonable seizure122—and thereby
worked under a narrower concept of what a new context was
than the majority did.123 Confronting the issue of the
transnational nature of the incident, the dissent believed it
“should not matter one whit” since the deterrent purpose of
the Bivens doctrine would still be served.124 In support of
this assertion, the dissent signaled to Mesa’s concession at
oral argument that the claim would have been valid if
Hernandez had been shot on the United States side of the
border.125 But each of the dissenters ’ arguments missed the
successful Bivens cases and concluded that they “[bore] little resemblance”
to each other. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860.
121 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 756 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Neither
Justice Alito’s nor Justice Ginsburg’s opinion attempted to compare
Hernandez to the third affirmative Supreme Court Bivens case, Carlson,
during this part of the analysis. See id. at 743–44, 756–57. This was most
likely because Carlson was an Eighth Amendment claim, whereas
Hernandez was based on the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and one way
a case may arise in a new context is if the rights that are allegedly violated
are different from those of any other previous Bivens cases successfully
litigated at the Supreme Court level. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860.
122 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 753–54, 756 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“Rogue U.S. officer conduct falls within a familiar, not a ‘new,’ Bivens
setting.”).
123 Cf. id. at 743–44 (majority opinion) (warrantless search and arrest).
124 Id. at 756 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). However, the purpose of this part
of the analysis is not to determine whether Bivens’s purposes are being
fulfilled, but rather to keep Bivens in check. See, e.g., id. at 739 (majority
opinion) (“[T]he Constitution’s separation of powers requires us to exercise
caution before extending Bivens to a new ‘context.’”); Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at
1848 (“Bivens is well-settled law in its own context, but expanding
the Bivens remedy [to new contexts] is now considered a ‘disfavored’
judicial activity.” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009))).
125 Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 756 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). That the party
conceded that point, though, does not make it a legal truth; there may be
arguments to be made for that point but the party might have chosen the
strategy to concede in order to highlight the existence of an international
border as the distinguishing circumstance. Cf. Amy Larson, 4 Important
Insights for a Strong Litigation Strategy and How to Easily Attain Them,
ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 21, 2018, 1:42 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/smallfirm-center/2018/09/4-important-insights-for-a-strong-litigation-strategyand-how-to-easily-attain-them/ (“What all judges want is for attorneys to
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mark.126

2. VERDICT
Overall, the majority’s characterization of the Bivens,
Davis, and Hernandez contexts was closer to recent
precedent than the dissent’s.127 To illustrate: in Abbasi’s
context analysis, the Court was fairly specific, describing
Bivens as “a claim against FBI agents for handcuffing a man
in his own home without a warrant.”128 Comparing that to
the Hernandez majority describing it as an “allegedly
unconstitutional arrest and search carried out in New York
City,”129 it becomes clear that the dissent’s description,
“[r]ogue U.S. officer conduct,” was extremely broad.130
Moreover, the dissent utilized a statement from Abbasi—
that the “opinion [was] not intended to cast doubt on the
continued force, or even the necessity, of Bivens in the
search-and-seizure context in which it arose”—and
interpreted it to mean that Bivens’s context was a broad
search-and-seizure-by-law-enforcement context.131 This was
a misinterpretation.132 For perspective, the Abbasi Court
followed up its statement with a more precise description of
make it as uncomplicated as possible for them to rule on a case. . . . [M]ake
sure your strategy includes how to distinguish your case from those they’ve
ruled on previously.”).
126 See infra Part IV.A.2.
127 See infra text accompanying notes 128–135.
128 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860 (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296
(1983)*; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971)). The
Court in Abbasi was also specific with its description of Carlson as “a claim
against prison officials for failure to treat an inmate’s asthma” and of
Davis as “a claim against a Congressman for firing his female secretary,”
rather than broad cruel and unusual punishment or due process
violations. See id. *Note that the Court erroneously cited to Chappell
instead of Carlson, as the Court was describing the three approved Bivens
contexts, which Chappell was not one of. See id.; supra Part II.A.
129 Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 744 (majority opinion) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S.
at 389).
130 See id. at 753 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
131 Cf. id. at 756 (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856, 1877)
(“Abbasi acknowledged the ‘fixed principle’ that plaintiffs may
bring Bivens suits against federal law enforcement officers for ‘seizure[s]’
that violate the Fourth Amendment.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1877)).
132 See infra text accompanying notes 133–135.

224

9 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2021)

the context than that.133 That precise description grants
credence to the idea that the Court meant to preserve Bivens
actions for the specific context that Bivens presented within
the search-and-seizure realm.134 Certainly, one search-andseizure case could be different in a meaningful way from
another.135
While the majority accurately defined the contexts,
its holding that this context was different in a meaningful
way, and thus a new context, lacked detailed explication.136
But there were considerations the majority could have
brought up to bolster its holding, including the potential
effect on foreign relations.137 Additionally, whereas the
dissent pointed out that lethal force may constitute an
unreasonable seizure in the right circumstances,138 the
majority could have used the application of lethal force to
show how the official in Hernandez operated under a
different “statutory or other legal mandate” (from Abbasi’s
meaningful difference list) since the officials in Bivens did
not employ lethal force.139 Otherwise, the majority could
have attempted to call upon other significant legal principles
or facts that were implicated in Hernandez and not in Bivens
or Davis.140 For instance, this could have been: the officers’
See supra text accompanying note 128.
See supra text accompanying note 128. This viewpoint was advocated
in many concurring opinions in this line of cases, that “Bivens and its two
follow-on cases . . . [should be limited] to the precise circumstances that
they involved.” See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct at 1870 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 568 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)); Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 131–32 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001)
(Scalia, J., concurring)); Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 568 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring)); Malesko, 534
U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The dissent is doubtless correct that a
broad interpretation of its rationale would logically produce such
application, but I am not inclined (and the Court has not been inclined) to
construe Bivens broadly.”).
135 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
136 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 743–44 (majority opinion).
137 Cf. id. at 744 (“[M]atters relating ‘to the conduct of foreign relations . .
. are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to
be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.’” (quoting Haig v.
Agee 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981))). This factor was discussed at length in the
next part of the analysis, the special factors inquiry. See id. at 744–45.
138 See id. at 756 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)).
139 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859.
140 See, e.g., infra notes 141–144.
133
134
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use of self-defense,141 homicide versus warrantless search
and seizure and wrongful termination of employment,142 the
officers’ likely levels of premeditation or otherwise their
mental states at the time of the incident,143 or the
Department of Justice’s investigation and conclusion that
Mesa had done no wrong.144 Using any of the preceding ideas
would have reinforced the majority’s argument and
explained why it thought Hernandez was so different from
Bivens and Davis, reducing some of the criticism that the
Court was making arbitrary rulings.145
The conclusion here is that Hernandez did present a
new context, even though the majority did not fully explain
why.146 Thus, a special-factors analysis was required to
determine whether the Court should have extended a Bivens

See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 740 (majority opinion) (“According to
Agent Mesa, Hernández and his friends were involved in an illegal border
crossing attempt, and they pelted him with rocks.”); Hernandez v. Mesa,
885 F.3d 811, 822 n.22 (5th Cir. 2018) (“If the dissenters’ position here
prevails, whenever Border Patrol officers return fire in self-defense, and
someone gets hurt in Mexico, Bivens suits will follow.”), aff’d, 140 S. Ct.
735 (2020).
142 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 740; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230–
31 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
143 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 740; Davis, 442 U.S. at 230; Bivens, 403
U.S. at 389. While Mesa’s mental state would likely be a matter of factfinding at trial, the Court might have considered—solely for the purposes
of determining context—the likelihood that Mesa had a different mental
state than the actors in both Bivens and Davis. Cf. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct.
at 740; Davis, 442 U.S. at 230; Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. For example,
Border Patrol agents reacting to a situation encountered in the regular
discharge of their duties may have a different state of mind than agents
bursting into a private residence to execute a search and arrest without
legal authority or than a congressman firing an administrative assistant
because she was a woman. Cf. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 740 (explaining
that Mesa lawfully detained one of Hernandez’s friends before firing);
Davis, 442 U.S. at 230 n.3 (“You are able, energetic and a very hard
worker. . . . [H]owever . . . I concluded that it was essential that the
understudy to my Administrative Assistant be a man.”); Bivens, 403 U.S.
at 389 (explaining that agents entered the apartment “under claim of
federal authority,” arrested Bivens, and made threats against the family).
144 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 740.
145 See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Disingenuous Demise and Death of
Bivens, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 2019–2020, at 282 (“[Hernandez] eviscerated
those distinctions, too—again, without any acknowledgment that it was
doing so or any explanation for why.”).
146 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 743–44.
141
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remedy to this context.147

B. DID ANY SPECIAL FACTORS COUNSEL HESITATION
BEFORE EXTENDING BIVENS TO HERNANDEZ?
1. MAJORITY’S ARGUMENTS
The majority cited several factors it believed
counseled hesitation: “the potential effect on foreign
relations,” “implicat[ing] an element of national security,”
and a “survey of what Congress has done in statutes
addressing related matters.”148 In arguing the foreign
relations factor, the majority attributed authority to regulate
foreign relations to the political branches.149 In Hernandez,
the executive branch was especially implicated because of
the Department of Justice’s investigation and handling of
Mesa’s case, the decision to not extradite Mesa, and “the
Executive’s understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition of unreasonable seizures and [its] assessment of
circumstances at the border” that went into creating CBP
policy and training.150 Foreign policy was also implicated by
bringing various interests from each country to the forefront,
interests which had been the subject of diplomatic measures
like the Border
Violence Prevention
Council.151
Considering national security, the majority cited the
importance of maintaining a secure border along Mexico’s
territory and the central role of CBP and its officers in

See id.
See id. at 744–47.
149 See id. at 744 (quoting Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403
(2018)) (“The political branches, not the Judiciary, have the responsibility
and institutional capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns.”).
150 See id.
151 Id. at 745 (“The United States has an interest in ensuring that agents
assigned the difficult and important task of policing the border are held to
standards and judged by procedures that satisfy United States law and do
not undermine the agents’ effectiveness and morale. Mexico has an
interest in exercising sovereignty over its territory and in protecting and
obtaining justice for its nationals. It is not our task to arbitrate between
them.”). The Border Violence Prevention Council is led by CBP, Mexico’s
Secretariat of Foreign Relations, and Mexico’s Federal Police. See Border
Violence Prevention Council, Fact Sheet, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/bvpc-fact-sheet.pdf
(last visited Mar. 9, 2021).
147
148
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promoting that goal.152 It attempted to draw similarities
between Hernandez and the two previous Bivens cases that
involved military members (which were denied), stating: “We
have declined to extend Bivens where doing so would
interfere with the system of military discipline created by
statute and regulation . . . .”153 Because both the military
and CBP were closely tied to national security and the Court
had previously denied Bivens claims by military members,
the majority reasoned, CBP officers should not be subject to
Bivens claims either.154
The majority supported its final special factor—
Congress’s actions in this area—by noting that “Congress
ha[d] repeatedly declined to authorize the award of damages
for injury inflicted outside our borders,” and finding that this
neglect was a calculated exclusion.155 The majority backed
this assertion by pointing to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which created
personal damages liability for officials acting under state law
who violate constitutional rights.156 Congress limited §
1983’s reach to cover “citizen[s] of the United States or other
person[s] within the jurisdiction thereof.”157 Given that
limit, a presumption that statutes have no effect outside the
United States, and a prior holding that “[i]t would be
‘anomalous to impute . . . a judicially implied cause of action
beyond the bounds [Congress has] delineated for [a]
comparable express caus[e] of action,’” the majority believed
there was ample reason to hesitate in applying Bivens to a

See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 746 (“The lawful passage of people and
goods in both directions across the border is beneficial to both countries.
Unfortunately, there is also a large volume of illegal
cross-border traffic. . . . [Among other things], powerful criminal
organizations operating on both sides of the border present a serious law
enforcement problem for both countries.”).
153 See id. at 746–47 (citing United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987);
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983)).
154 See id. at 747 (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861 (2017)) (“[A]
similar consideration is applicable here. Since regulating the conduct of
agents at the border unquestionably has national security implications,
the risk of undermining border security provides reason to hesitate before
extending Bivens into this field.”).
155 See id. (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862 (2017)) (calling Congress’s
lack of action “telling”).
156 See id.
157 Id. (alterations in original).
152
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harm suffered outside of the United States. 158
The majority wrapped up its special-factors analysis
by placing it all under the umbrella of the separation of
powers.159 In sum, because foreign relations were within the
purview of the political branches and Congress had chosen
to avoid providing for this type of action, the majority decided
it was not the Court who should create the remedy but
Congress.160

2. DISSENT’S ARGUMENTS
The dissent could not conceive of any special factor
that would preclude Hernandez’s parents from bringing the
lawsuit and offered rebuttals to the majority’s reasoning.161
The dissent attempted to discredit foreign policy and
national security as reasons to hesitate by first
distinguishing Hernandez from Abbasi, which also invoked

See id. (alterations in original) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 736 (1975)). The FTCA and the Torture Victim
Protection Act (TVPA) were other pillars of support on this point. See id.
at 748. The FTCA, as “the exclusive remedy for most claims against
Government employees arising out of their official conduct,” does not allow
for claims “arising in a foreign country.” Id. (first quoting Hui v.
Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 806 (2010); then quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680
(2018)). The TVPA—while a mechanism for non-U.S. citizens to redress
injury suffered outside the United States through the U.S. court system—
does not apply to injuries caused by United States officials. Id. (quoting
Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring)).
159 See id. at 749.
160 See id. at 749–50.
161 See id. at 757 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[N]ot one of the ‘special
factors’ the Court identifies weigh any differently based on where a bullet
happens to land.”). Justice Ginsburg repeatedly insisted that a bullet just
happened to land on the Mexico side of the border and strike a Mexican
national and that those facts were irrelevant to the outcome of this legal
issue. See id. at 756–57. This was a disingenuous tactic likely employed
in an effort to minimize the significance of international boundaries in
order to reach the desired outcome of allowing the Bivens action to proceed,
because earlier in her opinion she explicitly recognized: “Hernandez [had]
retreated into Mexican territory. Mesa pointed his weapon across the
border, ‘seemingly taking careful aim,’ and fired at least two shots.” See
id. at 753. This shows that Justice Ginsburg was aware that Mesa’s
actions were deliberate and that where the bullet impacted was not “a
happenstance subsequent to the conduct.” See id. at 756.
158
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these factors.162 The dissent noted that Abbasi drew
distinctions between cases against policymakers and cases
for “individual instances of . . . law enforcement overreach”163
while warning against misusing the national security “‘label’
. . . to ‘cover a multitude of sins’” by rejecting claims. 164 Here,
however, the majority and the dissent held nuanced views on
the concept of foreign policy.165 Whereas the majority talked
more broadly about, for example, foreign relations and
foreign policy concerns, the dissent limited foreign policy to
mean a formal policy already in place.166 Additionally, in the
dissent’s eyes, the fact that courts address other types of
conduct at the border “concurrently with whatever
diplomacy may also be addressing them” was reason enough
to extend Bivens to this new cross-border shooting context.167
See id. at 757–58. The primary difference was that the plaintiffs
brought claims against the policymakers in Abbasi, whereas Mesa was not
a policymaker but an agent that supposedly violated the laws and policies
in place. Id.
163 See id. (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017)). The
Abbasi Court made the distinction based on the general differences in how
each could be redressed, identifying individual overreach cases as “difficult
to address except by way of damages actions after the fact,” holding that
the plaintiffs, in suing the policymakers, could seek an injunction or other
form of relief instead of a Bivens claim. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862–63.
164 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 758 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862).
165 See infra text accompanying note 166.
166 See, e.g., Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 744 (majority opinion) (“The first
[factor] is the potential effect on foreign relations. ‘The political branches,
not the Judiciary, have the responsibility and institutional capacity to
weigh foreign-policy concerns.’” (quoting Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S.
Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018))); id. at 758 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (“The special
factors featured by the Court relate, in the main, to foreign policy and
national security. But . . . no policies or policymakers are challenged in
this case.”).
167 See id. at 758 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Rodriguez v. Swartz,
899 F.3d 719, 747 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated, 140 S. Ct. 1258 (2020) (mem.)).
Justice Ginsburg identified Rodriguez v. Swartz as a similar cross-border
shooting case in which the Ninth Circuit held the family could bring an
action under Bivens and she stated “[t]he Government has identified no
deleterious effect on diplomatic negotiations” subsequent to that decision.
Id. (citing Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 734). Perhaps an important distinction
between these two cases is that in Rodriguez the U.S. government believed
the Border Patrol agent had committed a wrongdoing and tried him for
murder. See Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 734. By way of contrast, where one
government believes the agent followed policy, training, and the law, but
the other does not, a deleterious effect could conceivably arise. Cf. supra
162
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Moreover, according to the dissent, “the Court, in this case,
[could not] escape a ‘potential effect on foreign relations’ by
declining to recognize a Bivens action” because the Mexican
Government said doing so “ha[d] the potential to negatively
affect international relations.”168 The dissent then argued
that allowing a Bivens action would be in line with United
States foreign policy by citing an “international
commitment” the United States had made, which stated that
“[a]nyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or
detention
shall
have
an
enforceable
right
to
compensation.”169
Finally, the dissent analyzed the congressional
actions cited by the majority and concluded that “[n]one of
[them] should stand in plaintiffs’ way.”170 According to the
dissent, § 1983 did not serve as evidence that Congress
intended to exclude actions for constitutional violations by
federal officials because it was originally intended to
guarantee rights for former slaves, so there was no way
Congress would have contemplated its applicability to a
cross-border shooting with a CBP agent.171 The FTCA
likewise did not apply because Congress’s intention there
was not to limit officer liability for a harm suffered outside
the country, but rather to limit the United States’ liability
under laws of another country.172 Furthermore, the TVPA
had no bearing because it did not apply to violators acting
under U.S. law at all.173 Rather, that Congress had done
nothing to invalidate the Bivens doctrine spoke to Congress’s
consent to allow Bivens claims.174 The dissent then argued
against the presumption that U.S. laws only apply in the
United States, stating, in line with Supreme Court
precedent, that the presumption was “displaced” since the
text accompanying notes 104–105 (discussing the opposing viewpoints of
the Mexican and U.S. governments with respect to treatment of Mesa’s
situation).
168 Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 758 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original) (quoting Brief for Government of the United Mexican States
as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners 12 (Aug. 9, 2019)).
169 See id. (quoting International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 9, Dec. 19, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 176).
170 Id. at 759.
171 Id. at 759 (quoting Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 742) (citing Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238–39 (1972)).
172 Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 707 (2004)).
173 Id.
174 See id. at 758.
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conduct “touch[ed] and concern[ed] the territory of the
United States . . . with sufficient force”—Mesa did fire from
within the United States, after all.175
The dissent concluded by making an appeal to
emotion with statistics about issues at the border and by
“resist[ing] the conclusion” that plaintiffs in these cases
should go home with nothing.176
In short, because
Hernandez’s parents had no other possible remedy,177
national security and foreign relations issues provided no
reasons to hesitate, and Congress had manifested no
disapproval, the dissent would have extended Bivens here.178

3. VERDICT
Regarding the foreign relations factor, the majority
had the stronger argument.179 While the dissent was correct
that courts do address other border issues that are the
subject of diplomatic efforts (the dissent gave “smuggling” as
an example),180 it ignored the fact that the United States
already codified laws that deal with those specific border

Id. at 759 (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108,
124–25 (2013)).
176 See id. at 759–60. The number of complaints against CBP agents and
the response by the government to those cases was irrelevant to the legal
question at issue but was used as if it was justification for instituting a
Bivens claim. Cf. id. (“[W]ithout the possibility of civil liability, the
unlikely prospect of discipline or criminal prosecution will not provide a
meaningful deterrent to abuse at the border.” (quoting Brief of Amici
Curiae Former Officials of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency in
Support of Petitioners 4 (Aug. 9, 2019))); 15 Logical Fallacies You Should
Know Before Getting into a Debate, Heading for Causal Fallacy, THE BEST
SCHOOLS
(June
9,
2020)
[hereinafter
Fallacies],
https://thebestschools.org/magazine/15-logical-fallacies-know/ (describing
the appeal to pity/emotion fallacy).
177 Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 757 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Justice
Ginsburg also distinguished Hernandez from Abbasi on this point, since in
Abbasi it was “of central importance” in denying a Bivens remedy that the
plaintiffs had alternative options for a remedy. See id. (quoting Ziglar v.
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017)). Justice Ginsburg also correctly
noted that “the absence of alternative remedies, standing alone, does not
warrant a Bivens action.” Id.
178 See id. at 753.
179 See infra text accompanying notes 180–185.
180 See supra text accompanying note 167.
175
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issues.181 The dissent’s view of foreign policy was too narrow
to respect the process of identifying special factors since
Abbasi called for any “sound reasons” to pause, which would
presumably include more than only standing, formal
policies.182 Further, the dissent’s argument that disallowing
a Bivens suit would negatively impact foreign relations was
misplaced since the inquiry was not whether inaction by the
Court would have any negative effect, but whether the Court
“[was] well suited, absent congressional action or instruction,
to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a
damages action to proceed.”183 Because foreign relations are
within the purview of the other branches of government, the
dissent sought to overstep the separation of powers by its
valuation of the Mexican government’s petition. 184 Indeed,
that four Justices would attempt to make that judgment
while playing blind to any possible countervailing U.S.
interests at the same time that five other Justices named
various reasons to hesitate is clear evidence that the Court
was not well suited to make that kind of determination in

See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2018) (setting forth the circumstances that
constitute and the penalties for smuggling humans into the United
States); 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2018) (setting forth the circumstances that
constitute and the penalties for smuggling goods into the United States).
182 Cf. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858 (“[I]f there are sound reasons to think
Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy as
part of the system for enforcing the law and correcting a wrong, the courts
must refrain from creating the remedy in order to respect the role of
Congress in determining the nature and extent of federal-court
jurisdiction under Article III.”). While Abbasi itself was a case against
policies and policymakers—and thus not an identical precedent for calling
on foreign policy and national security as factors in Hernandez—Justice
Ginsburg should not have limited her analysis of factors counseling
hesitation to factors that had already been so deemed in Bivens
jurisprudence. Cf. id. (“This Court has not defined the phrase ‘special
factors counselling hesitation.’”). The Ninth Circuit took a similar “highly
specific” approach in its ruling on Hernandez’s sister case, Rodriguez,
which analysis was predicted to fail at the Supreme Court while the Fifth
Circuit’s analysis was predicted to be upheld. See Green, supra note 84,
at II.-31 to -32 (2020); supra note 167 (introducing the circumstances of
Rodriguez).
183 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858.
184 Cf. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 744 (majority opinion) (quoting
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018)) (“The political
branches, not the Judiciary, have the responsibility and institutional
capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns.”).
181
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this case.185
Turning to national security, the dissent rightly
pointed out the main weakness in the majority’s argument:
that it talks about the importance of maintaining national
security and how CBP fits into that scheme, but it “does not
home in on how a Bivens suit for an unjustified killing would
in fact undermine security at the border.”186 Using Abbasi’s
warning about “cover[ing] a multitude of sins” under a
national security label was particularly effective in making
this point because each branch of the government has a part
to play in achieving national security, and as long as an issue
fits properly within that framework, saying the words
“national security” should not automatically dispose of it.187
The majority’s attempt to tie off this factor by relating it to
military discipline was dubious because military service is
unique for many reasons beyond just its relation to national
security.188 And so, the dissent’s argument was stronger on
Cf. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 746 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[The United
States] then says that if we extend Bivens here, it will ‘inject the courts
into these sensitive matters of international diplomacy and risk
undermining the government’s ability to speak with one voice in
international affairs.’”); supra Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2 (naming foreign
relations, national security, and congressional actions as reasons to
hesitate versus attempting to refute those reasons).
Using the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights did lend support to
Justice Ginsburg’s argument, but the same conclusion would be reached,
that, because five of the Justices did not even address the United States’
international commitments, the Court was not the forum to affirmatively
make decisions touching foreign policy concerns.
See supra text
accompanying notes 169, 185.
186 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 758 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
187 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1861–62.
188 See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983). To this point, in
Chappell the Court stated:
The need for special regulations in relation to military
discipline, and the consequent need and justification for
a special and exclusive system of military justice, is too
obvious to require extensive discussion; no military
organization can function without strict discipline and
regulation that would be unacceptable in a civilian
setting. . . . The Court has often noted “the peculiar and
special relationship of the soldier to his superiors,” and
has acknowledged that “the rights of men in the armed
forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain
overriding demands of discipline and duty. . . .” This
becomes imperative in combat, but conduct in combat
185
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the national security factor.189
As with the contexts analysis, the majority had
opportunities to “home in” on the negative effects that
allowing the lawsuit could have on national security, which
would have made its argument stronger.190 For one, the
majority should have argued that the action could exact a toll
on society, including by excessively deterring CPB officials
from performing their duties the way they should.191 The
inevitably reflects the training that precedes combat; for
that reason, centuries of experience has developed a
hierarchical structure of discipline and obedience to
command, unique in its application to the military
establishment and wholly different from civilian
patterns. Civilian courts must, at the very least,
hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the
court to tamper with the established relationship
between enlisted military personnel and their superior
officers; that relationship is at the heart of the
necessarily unique structure of the military
establishment.
Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110,
112 (1954); then quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)
(plurality opinion)) (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743–44 (1974);
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953)). Since federal law
enforcement officers are civilians and not military, they do not fall under
the separate framework for military justice and regulation that was put in
place under Congress’s constitutional authority—instead, they are under
the same system that governs all civilians. Cf. id. at 302 (“Congress has
exercised its plenary constitutional authority over the military, has
enacted statutes regulating military life, and has established a
comprehensive internal system of justice to regulate military life, taking
into account the special patterns that define the military structure.”).
189 See supra text accompanying notes 186–188.
190 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 758 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); supra text
accompanying notes 136–137; infra text accompanying notes 191–198.
191 See Andrew Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National
Security, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1173–74 (2014). Professor Kent made
the point, without determining the value of such considerations weighed
against countervailing reasons, “that damages suits . . . are likely to waste
officials’ time, cause excessive caution in the performance of official duties,
and deter good people from entering government service, and there are
some reasons to think that these concerns are heightened in national
security and foreign affairs cases.” Id. at 1173. And when it comes to
national security, “boldness is arguably more necessary.” Id. at 1181.
However, others may argue that, in reality, federal officials are not
significantly deterred since research shows “[t]he threat of personal
liability appears . . . to be far more theoretical than real.” See James E.
Pfander et al., The Myth of Personal Liability: Who Pays When Bivens
Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. REV. 561, 578–584 (2020); infra Part V.B.
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main issue here is that the executive branch needs to “be able
to act quickly, vigorously, and flexibly to meet dangerous and
unforeseen or changing circumstances” in the national
security sphere.192 Extending Bivens to Hernandez could
have resulted in “‘overdeterrence,’ which occurs when the
fear of personal damages liability discourages the vigorous,
efficient, and socially beneficial performance of official
functions, either because there is some doubt about what the
law requires or there is a prospect of meritless but
nevertheless costly damages suits.” 193 Regardless of the
outcome of a case like Hernandez, then, overdeterrence could
have a negative effect on national security that might
outweigh the benefits.194 For example, it is conceivable that
CBP agents would see Mesa go through a tough lawsuit, and,
even should Mesa prevail, be deterred from being diligent in
their duties for fear of going through the same.195 On the
other hand, should Mesa be found liable, agents still might
hesitate to exercise their duties since Mesa’s actions were
found to be within the scope of training and policy.196 In
either case, this could ultimately lead to a decrease in the
security of the border and more Border Patrol agents being
injured or killed in the line of duty.197 With a deeper analysis
that included the potential effects of overdeterrence, the
majority could have assuaged critics that believed the Court
was merely invoking national security to avoid an
“inconvenient claim.”198
Regarding the congressional actions factor, the
majority again had the better argument, if by a slimmer
margin.199 The dissent’s reasoning that “Congress knows
about the Bivens decision and has not sought to undo it;
Kent, supra note 191, at 1174.
Id.
194 See id.
195 See id.
196 See id.
197 Cf. id. (discussing the social costs of permitting damages actions
against individual federal officers).
198 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 758 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“[N]ational-security concerns must not become a talisman used to ward
off inconvenient claims—a ‘label’ used to ‘cover a multitude of sins.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862
(2017))). But cf. Kent, supra note 191 at 1181 (discussing a culture of
accountability that developed post-9/11 that may water down Bivens’s
deterrent effect).
199 See infra notes 200–208 and accompanying text.
192
193
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therefore, Congress wants Bivens to stay” was fallacious.200
Similarly, the logic behind the majority’s assertion that
“Congress has enacted similar statutes but never authorized
these actions against federal officials; therefore, Congress
does not want these actions to be allowed against federal
officials” was flawed at the basic level.201 What carried the
weight for the majority was the Court’s previous holding of
how “[i]t would be ‘anomalous to impute” Bivens to apply in
situations that Congress had not provided for in “comparable
express causes of action.”202 The dissent was able to point
out differences between Bivens suits and 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the FTCA, and the TVPA, yet it did not offer any other
express cause of action comparable to Bivens that could
support imputing Bivens to apply abroad.203
It was
incumbent on the dissent to show how imputing Bivens
would not have been “anomalous,” which it could have
accomplished by supplying an express cause of action that
both extended to a harm suffered outside the United States
and was comparable to Bivens.204 Because the dissent failed
to do this, its argument on this point was toothless and the
statutes the majority cited stood as the most comparable to
Bivens, showing that extending Bivens to a transnational
situation would be anomalous.205
The dissent’s final
argument that the circumstances of Hernandez “touch[ed]
and concern[ed] the territory of the United States . . . with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application” had some merit to it because
Mesa fired from U.S. soil.206 However, the case the dissent
relied on for that argument was born out of a situation
See supra text accompanying note 174.
See supra text accompanying note 155. That Congress had taken
neither of those actions could plausibly be attributed to other reasons;
thus, the Justices in both of the opinions were making conclusions
“without enough evidence to do so.” Cf. Fallacies, supra note 176
(describing the non causa pro causa fallacy).
202 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 747 (majority opinion) (quoting Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 736 (1975)).
203 See id. at 759 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
204 Cf. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 754–55 (denying expansion of an
implied action to a new class of plaintiffs where no comparable express
cause of action did the same).
205 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 747 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 736).
206 See id. at 759 (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S.
108, 124–25 (2013)).
200
201
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applying codified laws, while the case the majority relied on
for its “anomalous” argument specifically applied to
judicially implied causes of action.207 Thus, the majority’s
case was more fitting for the Court to consider here, so it
carried more weight.208
In summary, despite the majority’s anemic argument
on the national security factor, the Court encountered
sufficient special factors that counseled hesitation and thus
the Court correctly denied the Bivens extension.209

C. HAS BIVENS’S FOUNDATION ERODED AWAY?
Hernandez was the tenth consecutive case in which
the Court did not extend Bivens, dating back to 1983.210 With
the Court denying all these cases and whittling Bivens down
for so long, Bivens’s validity necessarily comes into
question.211 The concurrence minced no words in expressing
the opinion that Bivens was bad law and should be done
away with for good.212 While the majority stopped short of
commenting explicitly on Bivens’s future, some aspects of its
opinion lent support to the concurrence’s proposition—that
it was outside of the Court’s authority to create remedies
without a statute.213
See id. (“We presume that statutes do not apply extraterritorially to
‘ensure that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of
U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by
the political branches.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013))); Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25
(declining to extend the Alien Tort Statute to conduct that occurred
entirely outside the country).
208 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 747 (majority opinion) (quoting Blue Chip
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 736).
209 See id. at 744–50.
210 See supra Part II.B.
211 See infra text accompanying notes 212–227.
212 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 752–53 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The
analysis underlying Bivens cannot be defended. We have cabined the
doctrine’s scope, undermined its foundation, and limited its precedential
value. It is time to correct this Court’s error and abandon the doctrine
altogether.”).
213 See infra note 216. In fact, “[i]f the [Hernandez] majority were to
address a direct challenge to Bivens, they would be able to use the same
reasoning displayed in [Hernandez]. In such a scenario, it may be hard to
justify the continuance of Bivens.” Daniel Blair, Note, One Step Away:
How Hernández II Signals the Elimination of Bivens, 64 ST. LOUIS L.J.
207
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First attacking the foundation on which Bivens
rested, the concurrence pointed out that, whereas in the days
when Bivens was decided “the Court freely created implied
private causes of action for damages under federal statutes,”
the Court later ceased that “misguided” practice, and even
went so far as to abrogate case law that Bivens was built
on.214 The plaintiffs in Hernandez asserted that Bivens was
much like a common-law action and that since federal
officials were once subject to tort liability under common law,
Bivens should apply.215 However, as the majority noted,
“federal general common law” ceased to exist after the
decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins in 1938, so federal courts
had no authority to “rais[e] up causes of action where a
statute ha[d] not created them.”216 It is because of this
philosophical shift that the Court turned completely away
from expanding Bivens, called Bivens expansion “a
disfavored judicial activity,” and suggested that had Bivens
and its expansion cases appeared before the Supreme Court
today, Bivens actions would not exist.217 As the Court noted
previously, “[s]tare decisis provides no ‘veneer of
respectability to our continued application of [these]

711, 724 (2020). The dissent avoided this conversation altogether. Cf.
Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 753–60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (failing to
address the issue of whether Bivens had a legal base to stand on).
214 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 750–51 (Thomas, J., concurring) (first
citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969); Allen
v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969); then citing Alexander
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)). As Justice Thomas had previously
mentioned: “Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court
assumed common-law powers to create causes of action.” Id. at 750
(quoting Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 568 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
215 Id. at 742 (majority opinion).
216 Id. (first quoting Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); then
quoting Alexander, 532 U.S. at 287). Justice Thomas further quoted the
Court’s Alexander decision, which “renounced the Court’s freewheeling
approach” because “[l]ike substantive federal law itself, private rights of
action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.” Id. at 751
(Thomas, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Alexander, 532
U.S. at 286).
217 Id. at 751–52 (Thomas, J., concurring) (first quoting Ziglar v.
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017); then quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at
1856); see also id. at 743 (majority opinion) (“[I]t is doubtful that we would
have reached the same result.”). After less than a decade of expansion,
the Court has not extended the doctrine to a case for over four decades.
See supra Part II.
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demonstrably incorrect precedents.’”218 So, then, what is left
to keep Bivens upright?219
The concurrence then described the continued use of
Bivens, even in the narrow set of situations in which it
already applied, as a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine.220 Defining the separation between the judiciary
and the legislature, the concurrence stated that it is a
“distinctly legislative task [to] creat[e] causes of action for
damages to enforce federal positive law,” and “[t]he judicial
task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to
determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a
private right but also a private remedy.”221 Since Congress
has the power to ensure federal officials are held accountable
for violating constitutional rights and has proven capable of
enacting such a law,222 courts should not be stepping into the
legislature’s role and doing that for them.223
These arguments are not new; they were recognized
in dissenting opinions in each of the affirmative Bivens cases,
including in Bivens itself.224 Those Justices saw the wisdom
in maintaining the integrity of the system of government as
divided between the judicial, legislative, and executive
branches.225 The process of weakening Bivens and limiting
Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 750 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Gamble
v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1981 (2019)).
219 Cf. id. at 752 (“Thus, it appears that we have already repudiated the
foundation of the Bivens doctrine; nothing is left to do but overrule it.”).
220 See id. at 750 (“To ensure that we are not ‘perpetuat[ing] a usurpation
of the legislative power,’ we should reevaluate our continued recognition
of even a limited form of the Bivens doctrine.” (alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1984 (Thomas, J.,
concurring))).
221 See id. at 751–52 (quoting Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286). “Without such
intent, ‘a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no
matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible
with the statute.’” Id. at 751 (quoting Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286–87).
222 See supra text accompanying note 156.
223 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 752 (“[I]t is not for us to fill
any hiatus Congress has left in this area.” (alteration in original)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652
(1963))).
224 See supra Part II.A.
225 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 412 (1971) (Burger, J., dissenting).
And if it be true that the holders of legislative power are
careless or evil, yet the constitutional duty of the court
218
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its application was a manifestation of the Court returning to
that wisdom.226 Ultimately, the concurrence was correct that
Bivens no longer has a foundation to stand on and that the
separation of powers compels its overruling.227

V. IMPACT: A RARELY USED, RARELY SUCCESSFUL, AND
RARELY PUNITIVE ACTION
The Hernandez decision will probably be the last
Bivens case the Supreme Court hears before it throws Bivens
out entirely.228 The resulting impact Hernandez will have on
law enforcement and potential plaintiffs will likely be
minimal since Hernandez involves circumstances that occur
very infrequently.229 However, it may cause tension in
relationships between Mexico and the United States,
including among the people.230

A. LEGALLY SPEAKING
Hernandez has already had impacted the courtroom
at the highest level: The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling in Rodriguez v. Swartz and remanded with
instructions to implement the Hernandez decision.231 In
remains untouched; it cannot rightly attempt to protect
the people, by undertaking a function not its own. On
the other hand, by adhering rigidly to its own duty, the
court will help, as nothing else can, to fix the spot where
responsibility lies, and to bring down on that precise
locality the thunderbolt of popular condemnation. . . .
For that course—the true course of judicial duty
always—will powerfully help to bring the people and
their representatives to a sense of their own
responsibility.
Id. (quoting JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES & FELIX
FRANKFURTER, JOHN MARSHALL 88 (Phoenix ed.) (1967)).
226 Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 31 (1980) (Burger, J., dissenting) (“I
cannot escape the conclusion that in future cases the Court will be obliged
to retreat from the language of today's decision.”).
227 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 752 (Thomas, J., concurring); Vladeck,
supra note 145, at 282 (“[A]t least for a majority of the current Court,
there’s no remaining affirmative case for Bivens.”).
228 See infra Part V.A.
229 See infra Part V.B.
230 See infra Part V.B.
231 See Swartz v. Rodriguez, 140 S. Ct. 1258 (2020) (mem.).

LAYING IT ON THE LINE

241

Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit, faced with a cross-border
shooting by Border Patrol, had found that the facts presented
a new context and that no special factors counseled
hesitation, thus extending Bivens.232 With the Court in
Hernandez deciding that special factors counseled hesitation
on such broad, less specific terms, it is difficult to imagine a
scenario in which any court applying Hernandez’s ruling to
Rodriguez’s facts would not conclude that special factors
counsel hesitation.233 Thus, Rodriguez will likely not be
granted the Bivens extension, either.234
As for other effects on the law, whereas the Court in
Abbasi spoke of intent to preserve Bivens claims for certain
contexts, particularly where a case deals with search and
seizure by law enforcement, Hernandez “eviscerated”
Bivens’s applicability to such overreach.235 Moreover, after
the Abbasi and Hernandez decisions, in conjunction with
other Supreme Court opinions, there is “doubt [about] the
ability of the lower courts to preside over a system of
remedies in law and equity that will stay in touch with one
another.”236 With the current appointed Justices, another
Bivens case reaching the Supreme Court would likely result
in the end of the Bivens doctrine.237
Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 738–39 (9th Cir. 2018).
Cf. supra text accompanying note 186 (discussing the majority’s lack of
specificity when considering national security as a factor). The alleged
facts of Rodriguez are that a Border Patrol agent shot from the United
States and killed a Mexican-national teenager (J.A.), who was simply
walking down a street in Nogales, Mexico. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 727.
The U.S. side of the border in Nogales, Arizona, was elevated about
twenty-five feet higher than the road in Mexico. Id. Marking the border
was a fence rising over twenty feet above the ground on the U.S. side. Id.
While on duty, Agent Swartz fired his pistol from Arizona, through the
fence, hitting J.A. ten times. Id. The Department of Justice tried Swartz
for J.A.’s murder. Id. at 734. While Swartz was acquitted of murder, the
jury was hung on manslaughter and Swartz would be retried. Id. at 734
n.58. Had the Hernandez decision been more particular in its reasoning,
Rodriguez may have had a better chance at getting the Bivens remedy
because of factual differences between the two cases (such as a marked
border, DOJ prosecution, and mental state of the federal agent). See supra
text accompanying notes 137–145, 190–198.
234 See Green, supra note 84, at II.-31 to -32 (2020).
235 Vladeck, supra note 145, at 282–83.
236 James E. Pfander & Wade Formo, The Past and Future of Equitable
Remedies: An Essay for Frank Johnson, 71 ALA. L. REV. 723, 748 (2020).
237 See Blair, supra note 213, at 723–24. As Blair pointed out:
232
233
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The Hernandez decision was another step in the right
direction for the separation of powers.238 Maintaining
separation of powers is crucial to the integrity of a system
with divided powers, as in the United States.239 A system of
rogue branches of government overstepping their boundaries
would be a corrupt system.240 “By adhering rigidly to its own
duty, the court [has] help[ed] . . . to fix the spot where
responsibility lies . . . .” 241 If a “thunderbolt of popular
condemnation” should be brought down for the result in
Hernandez, it belongs not on the Court, but on Congress.242

B. PRACTICAL EFFECTS
But what practical effect might Hernandez have on
society?243 In a survey of data from five federal districts over
three years, Bivens suits comprised 1.2% of the civil claims
arising under a federal question and less than 0.2% of all civil

[The] Roberts Court has engaged in a pattern [called]
“the doctrine of one last chance” in which the Court will
“signal its readiness to impose major disruptions before
actually doing so.” If this theory were to play out here,
Hernández II would serve as the last warning that
Bivens claims will be overturned altogether.
Id. at 723 (footnote omitted) (quoting Richard M. Re, The Doctrine of One
Last Chance, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 173 (2014)).
238 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 751–52 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
239 See BEAU STEENKEN & TINA M. BROOKS, SOURCES OF AMERICAN LAW 9
(CALI eLangdell Press ed., 4th ed. 2019) (“At the same time that the
Founding Fathers, in drafting the Constitution, limited the central
government to enumerated powers, they also broke the federal
government into three distinct branches. They did so in the hopes that the
various branches would serve as checks and balances on each other and
prevent the sort of tyranny that the former colonists rejected from the
unified British government. . . . Indeed, every state government in the
U.S. features Separation of Powers.”).
240 Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice?,
54 B.C. L. Rev. 433, 444 (2013) (suggesting the separation of powers is
essential for liberty and the rule of law).
241 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 412 (1971) (Burger, J., dissenting) (quoting JAMES BRADLEY
THAYER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES & FELIX FRANKFURTER, JOHN MARSHALL
88 (Phoenix ed.) (1967))).
242 See id.
243 See infra text accompanying notes 244–268.
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claims.244 Bivens claims involving a cross-border shooting of
a foreign national would be a significantly smaller portion
than that.245 In fact, only 15.8% of the Bivens claims were
based on the Fourth Amendment. 246 And of the Bivens
claims in these districts, just 16.2% were successful.247
Confining Hernandez’s ruling to cases with similar facts,
then, this holding will hardly be noticed as a speed bump to
the courts—more like a pebble in the road.248 If the Supreme
Court puts Bivens to rest permanently, the number of
potential plaintiffs that otherwise would have seen some
relief as a result of their Bivens claims would be
infinitesimal.249
Among the perspectives surrounding Bivens is the
idea that a holding such as the one in Hernandez would
“create a dangerous loophole where federal law enforcement
officials will face no consequences for extraterritorial
killings.”250 However, this is ignorant to the fact that law
enforcement can be held liable for crimes committed in the
scope of the officer’s official capacity, including murder and
violations of constitutional rights,251 and the employer
agency can hold its employees accountable for violating its

Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and
Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809,
837 (2010).
245 See id. Forty-nine percent of these Bivens claims were about conditions
in prison while the remaining fifty-one percent were all other Bivens
claims. Id.
246 See id. at 836 n.138.
247 Id. The success rate for Fourth Amendment Bivens cases was higher
than the overall rate, at 28.9%—a sheer total of eleven successful cases for
the three-year period. Id. For this study, success was measured as “a
judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff, a settlement of some kind, or a
stipulated/voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff.” Id. at 812 n.13.
248 Cf. id. at 386–87 (discussing the rare frequency with which Bivens
lawsuits are brought and successful).
249 See supra text accompanying notes 244–247.
250 Green, supra note 84.
251 See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 734 (9th Cir. 2018); Law
Enforcement
Misconduct,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/law-enforcement-misconduct (last updated
July 6, 2020) (“The Department of Justice . . . vigorously investigates and,
where the evidence permits, prosecutes allegations of Constitutional
violations by law enforcement officers. . . . The Department’s authority
extends to all law enforcement conduct, regardless of whether an officer is
on or off duty, so long as he/she is acting, or claiming to act, in his/her
official capacity.”).
244

244

9 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2021)

policies.252
Additionally, one might argue that the
importance of the job federal law enforcement agents
perform outweighs the small chance that an agent may
violate someone’s constitutional rights, and thus the actual
risk of danger after Hernandez is not at an unacceptable
level.253
Alternatively, it is possible that Bivens may not be
having the full deterrent effect it was designed to have on
federal officials.254 If the purpose of Bivens was to keep
federal officials in line through fear of having to pay
exorbitant amounts because of potential lawsuits, 255 data
See HR Order DOJ1200.1: Part 3. Labor/Employee Relations: Chapter
3-1, Discipline and Adverse Actions (Aug. 25, 1998), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/hr-order-doj12001-part-3-laboremployeerelations (last updated Aug. 29, 2014) (setting out disciplinary procedures
for Department of Justice employees); see also Kent, supra note 191, at
1181–82 (describing a “thick new web of accountability mechanisms in the
national security area” that developed after 9/11). But cf. DHS Needs to
Improve Its Oversight of Misconduct and Discipline, OVERSIGHT.GOV,
https://www.oversight.gov/report/dhs/dhs-needs-improve-its-oversightmisconduct-and-discipline (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (“DHS does not have
sufficient policies and procedures to address employee misconduct. . . .
DHS also does not effectively manage the misconduct program throughout
the Department, lacking data monitoring and metrics to gauge program
performance.”).
253 Cf. About, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about (last visited Jan. 22, 2021)
(describing the FBI mission as “to help protect you, your children, your
communities, and your businesses . . . from international and domestic
terrorists to spies on U.S. soil, from cyber villains to corrupt government
officials, from mobsters to violent street gangs, from child predators to
serial killers.”); Careers, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
https://www.cbp.gov/careers (last visited Jan. 22, 2021) (describing the
CBP mission as to “[p]revent terrorists and terrorists [sic] weapons from
entering the United States” and noting that “on a typical day, CBP makes
900+ apprehensions and seizes 9,000+ pounds of illegal drugs.”). While
this is not the argument this Note makes, one could plausibly judge the
importance of those missions, consider the stringent requirements federal
law enforcement officials frequently must meet to be hired—minimum
education, background checks, and polygraph interviews, for example—
plus the quality of training each must undergo before arriving at their first
assignment, and reach such a conclusion. See, e.g., Border Patrol Agent
Application
Process,
U.S.
CUSTOMS
AND
BORDER
PROTECTION,https://www.cbp.gov/careers/frontline-careers/bpa/app-proc
(last visited Jan. 22, 2021); Eligibility
Requirements for Special
Agent Position, FBI JOBS, https://www.fbijobs.gov/career-paths/specialagents/eligibility (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
254 See Pfander et al., supra note 191.
255 See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994) (citing Carlson v. Green,
252
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shows that the individual officers are generally not fronting
the bill.256 In a study of Bivens cases involving the Bureau of
Prisons over a ten-year period, the individual officer and the
officer’s insurance contributed financially to the settlement
in less than five percent of cases that resulted in a
payment.257 The actual amount that officers and their
insurance contributed was far lower, totaling 0.32% of the
amounts plaintiffs received in these successful cases. 258 The
government essentially covered the rest of the payouts via
the Judgment Fund in the U.S. Treasury.259 By these
figures, one may wonder if Bivens truly serves as a deterrent
to official misconduct at all.260 If such was already the case,
Hernandez further delimiting the Bivens doctrine would not
likely create or even exacerbate any “dangerous loophole” for
law enforcement.261
446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980)) (“It must be remembered that the purpose of Bivens
is to deter the officer.”); Carlson, 446 U.S. at 25 (“[T]o prevent frustration
of the deterrence goals of § 1983 (which in part also
underlie Bivens actions) ‘[a] state official
contemplating illegal activity
must always be prepared to face the prospect of a § 1983 action being filed
against him.’ A federal official contemplating unconstitutional conduct
similarly must be prepared to face the prospect of [a Bivens] action.”)
(second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Robertson v.
Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592 (1978))).
256 See Pfander et al., supra note 191.
257 Id. at 579. Out of 171 of these cases, eight made up this subset. Id.
258 Id. The average contribution by officers and their insurance in these
eight cases was $7645. Id. at 581.
259 Id. at 594; see also Kent, supra note 191, at 1153 n.126 (“It is widely
asserted or assumed by scholars that, when sued under Bivens, nearly all
officials are defended and indemnified by their government employers so
that they do not incur an actual risk of monetary liability.”).
260 See Pfander et al., supra note 191, at 596 (“At the most basic level, the
data contradict the Supreme Court’s repeated assertion that federal
officials face a threat of significant personal financial responsibility in
these cases: The threat of personal liability appears from our data to be
far more theoretical than real.”). But see Kent, supra note 191, at 1153–
54. Although the prospects of a successful Bivens lawsuit are not excellent
and employers may indemnify their employees while the defendants will
be represented by the government, Professor Kent believes that Bivens
does still serve a deterrent purpose because indemnification is not an
entitlement and the defendant officers typically do not know whether they
will be indemnified until after disposition of the case. See id. The fact that
many of these employees are acquiring insurance policies itself shows that
personal liability is on their minds. Id. (“[T]his might well shape the
incentives or behavior of those officials.”).
261 Cf. Pfander et al., supra note 191 (comparing the financial impact of
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While Bivens may not be the legal solution to
government intrusion, it is still important to recognize the
human aspect encompassing Hernandez.262 It is a tragedy
that a young man was killed. 263 The perception that a Border
Patrol agent could get away with wrongfully killing an
innocent teenager could negatively impact relationships
between the United States and Mexico.264 Such a thought
would undoubtedly incense people’s emotions and could
strain the relationships that communities on the border have
with each other as well as the relationship between the
United States and Mexico governments.265 It may also
damage the United States’ global reputation for its
commitment to justice and legal principles.266 People’s
constitutional rights are vital, and safeguarding those rights
is imperative if they are to mean anything.267 As Bivens
withers away, it remains to be seen how Congress will
respond to the crescendo of demands for action on Bivens and

Bivens claims on officers against that on the government); Green, supra
note 84, at II.-32 (documenting the fear that Hernandez will allow federal
officers to escape consequences for cross-border shootings).
262 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 759–60 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
263 Id.
264 See id. at 758 (quoting Brief for Government of the United Mexican
States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners 12 (Aug. 9, 2019));
Green, supra note 84, at II.-32.
265 See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 758 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting
Brief for Government of the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Petitioners 12 (Aug. 9, 2019)); Green, supra note 84, at II.32.
266 Cf. Dominic Carman, Where Can You Find the Best Justice System?,
GLOBAL LEGAL CHRONICLE (June 14, 2019),
https://www.globallegalchronicle.com/where-can-you-find-the-bestjustice-system/. (reporting that the Rule of Law Index published by the
World Justice Project, which “measures how the rule of law is experienced
and perceived by the general public worldwide,” found the United States
at twentieth out of 126 countries examined).
267 See Blair, supra note 213 (“[T]he liberties of none are safe unless the
liberties of all are protected.” (alteration in original) (quoting WILLIAM O.
DOUGLAS, A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS 64 (Doubleday & Co. ed., 1961))).
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the related qualified immunity doctrine.268

VI. CONCLUSION: SIT NOT IDLY BY
A border, whether marked by a physical barrier or
not, demarcates where significant differences appear—
differences of nationalities, of languages, of heritage, of
dreams, and of legal authority.269 Even within a country,
these differences can be found by crossing borders into
different provinces or states.270 When an issue arises that
implicates a border, the rules change; no longer are the
interests of just one political, legal, or cultural body
implicated.271 When this happens at the international level
and no legal authority dictates what should happen,
diplomatic efforts must take place to weigh the costs and
See WHITNEY K. NOVAK, POLICING THE POLICE: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 1, 4, 5 (Cong. Research Serv. ed., 2020).
Qualified immunity (another court-made doctrine) provides a defense for
public officials, including law enforcement officers, who are defendants in
lawsuits for constitutional rights violations. Id. at 1. Justice Thomas has
equally called for a revisitation of qualified immunity, stating the Court
has likewise made “freewheeling policy choices” and done Congress’s job
as it advanced this doctrine. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871–
72 (Thomas, J., concurring). Novak noted:
Because qualified immunity is a product of statutory
interpretation, Congress has wide authority to amend,
expand, or even abolish the doctrine.
....
Questions could remain, however . . . . [A]bout whether
eliminating qualified immunity for state law
enforcement agents (or some subset of state actors)
under Section 1983—as several proposals would do—
would create an anomaly where the doctrine would still
exist for federal law enforcement agents under Bivens.
NOVAK, supra.
269 See Border, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC,
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/border/ (last
visited Feb. 6, 2021).
270 See, e.g., Mark Abadi, This Map Shows the US Really Has 11 Separate
'Nations' with Entirely Different Cultures, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 18,
2018, 2:04 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/regional-differencesunited-states-2018-1.
271 See Border, supra note 269. In the United States, for example, when a
crime crosses from one state into another, federal authorities may get
involved to investigate and prosecute what would normally have been
investigated and prosecuted at the state level. See Federal Crimes, JUSTIA,
https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/other-crimes/federalcrimes/ (last updated Apr. 2018).
268
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benefits of certain responses, including the interests of other
countries and the political goals of the legislative and
executive branches.272 The U.S. judiciary, as the interpreter
of U.S. laws, is a body that is neither granted the authority
to nor is well equipped for making this kind of decision.273
With that backdrop, when considering how the Bivens
doctrine would apply to Hernandez, it becomes clear that the
Court decided correctly.274 Bivens had been in a vegetative
state for decades.275 The cases it previously applied to were
drawn exceedingly narrowly and the Court had all but
decreed that it should not grow beyond its current limits.276
Bivens, having become brittle and stirring up separation-ofpowers arguments since its creation, was certainly not ripe
for application to an international incident evoking a
separation-of-powers conversation of its own
in
Hernandez.277
Now Bivens stands on the precipice of extinction, as it
will likely be (and should be) overturned in the not-so-distant
future.278 In light of the separation of powers, overturning
Bivens would be the right action.279 This Note echoes the
voices of those that call on Congress to specifically take up
the question of whether to provide for a damages remedy
against federal officers individually.280 To maintain the
integrity of the system of government and ensure justice is
served in accordance with it, Congress must weigh the
benefits and detriments of such actions and determine, with
specificity, where an enacted version of Bivens should apply,
where it should not apply, and what its scope should be.281

See supra Part IV.B.1.
See supra Part IV.B.1; cf. STEENKEN, supra note 239, at 11 (defining the
roles of each branch of government in the United States).
274 See supra Part IV.B.3.
275 See supra Part II.B.
276 See supra Part II.B.
277 See supra text accompanying notes 159–160.
278 See supra Part IV.C.
279 See supra Part V.A.
280 Cf., e.g., Green, supra note 84, at II.-33 (“Congress . . . should act
immediately to address civil liability in the context of extraterritorial
excessive force by federal agents at the United States border.”).
281 See supra text accompanying notes 238–242, 265–268.
272
273

